By Walter Boyd
The Declaration of Independence says governments derive their just powers from “the consent of the governed.” That principle should mean something when government acquires the ability to systematically track ordinary citizens.
Automated license plate readers can record when and where vehicles travel. Linked with other technologies, those records can reveal visits to churches, political meetings, medical facilities, or demonstrations—without suspicion of a crime.
These systems can help recover stolen vehicles, locate missing people, and investigate serious crimes. But usefulness is not consent.
In September, Blaine County Sheriff Morgan Ballis ordered a camera removed from Carey after learning officials and residents had not been consulted before installation. “Community trust depends on transparency and local input,” he said.
As a Principal Cybersecurity Architect, I have spent my career evaluating information-security risks. Annual privacy training during my years at a major technology company reinforced a simple principle: The safest way to protect sensitive information is not to collect it in the first place.
Information never collected cannot be stolen from a database, misused by an insider, accessed by an unauthorized agency, or repurposed years later. Encryption, access controls, and audits matter, but cannot eliminate collection risks. The people who bear those risks should decide whether to accept them.
That principle drives the Idaho Mass Surveillance Voter Authorization Act, my draft for public discussion. Communities would vote before covered systems could operate. Existing systems would require approval to continue under the transition provisions.
Votes would occur at regularly scheduled November general elections in even-numbered years, avoiding separate special-election costs and reaching the affected community’s full electorate. Voters would receive disclosures about capabilities, territory, costs, retention, access, and sharing. Authorization would require renewal at every presidential general election because technology, vendors, and sharing arrangements change.
The act would require probable-cause warrants for movement-history searches, with a limited exception for imminent threats to life. Officials, officers, and vendor employees who willfully misuse systems, such as tracking a former partner without investigative authorization, could face personal civil penalties up to $50,000 per violation.
Voter approval would not override the Constitution or replace judicial oversight. No majority can vote away First or Fourth Amendment rights.
Police body cameras and ordinary private security systems would remain exempt. Lawful investigations and emergency responses—including searches by officers and evidence collection relevant to particular incidents—would continue. An emergency would not authorize activating a mass-surveillance system without required voter approval.
Electing public officials does not give voters a specific choice about a surveillance system, its capabilities, or its reach. This act would require that choice.
The question is not only whether mass surveillance can be made secure. It is whether citizens consent to having their movements recorded in the first place. On that question, the voters must have the final say.
Walter Boyd is a principal cybersecurity architect, orchard owner, and Democratic candidate for Idaho House District 35A.